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INTRODUCTION 
Wang Yajuan of Shijiazhuang City, China, awoke at 7:00 
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and support. 
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a.m. every morning to begin her twelve-hour shift at a textile 
factory.1  Along with other children, she toiled at least twelve 
hours a day, seven days a week, and slept in a dilapidated, 
poorly ventilated factory room with no heat in the frigid 
winters.2  One night in December 2004, Yajuan and her 
roommates lit a small charcoal stove, only to be found dead 
the next morning from inhaling charcoal fumes.3  Yajuan’s 
labor, alongside countless other young victims, fuel a multi-
billion dollar counterfeit industry every year.4 
Eduardo Arias of Panama City, Panama, was shopping 
the aisles of a discount store when he spotted a tube of 
toothpaste labeled with the word, “Colgate,” being sold at a 
price so low that even street vendors purchased their 
supplies from the chain.5  But among the ingredients, where it 
should have listed “glycerin,” Arias caught the chemical name 
for antifreeze,6 the same toxic substitute that had already 
caused innumerable deaths in the country earlier in the year.7  
Within days, Mr. Arias lit the fuse that exposed a scandal of 
counterfeit products that would reverberate throughout the 
world.8  The fake Colgate toothpaste Mr. Arias found would 
eventually reach thirty-four countries, doled out to U.S. 
prisoners and wealthy patrons at high-end hotels alike.9 
 1. Jan Goodwin, The Human Cost of Fakes, HARPER’S  
BAZAAR, Jan. 1, 2006, at 54, available at http://www.jangoodwin.com/articles/ 
thehumancostoffakes.pdf. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See e.g., id. (In the morning, the factory owner ordered the girls’ bodies 
be quickly sealed in coffins and sent them off for cremation.  Later, an 
investigation would reveal that at least two of the girls had still been alive when 
they were entombed). 
 4. Jamie Corsi, For Companies, Counterfeit Battle is Never-Ending, CNBC 
(Jul. 90, 2010), http://www.cnbc.com/id/38125681 (“Watches, handbags, 
footwear and medicine made up more than $260 million in counterfeit products 
seized at US ports in 2009.”). 
 5. Walt Bogdanich, The Everyman Who Exposed Tainted Toothpaste,  
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/01/world/americas/ 
01panama.html? 
pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 6. David Von Drehle, Eduardo Arias – Person of the Year 2007, People  
Who Mattered, TIME (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/ 
personoftheyear/article/0,28804,1690753_1690758_1693575,00.html; see also 
Bogdanich, supra note 5. 
 7. Laura C. Nastase, Made in China: How Chinese Counterfeits are 
Creating a National Security Nightmare for the United States, 19 FORDHAM INT’L. 
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 143, 150 (2008) (citing Bogdanich, supra note 5). 
 8. Von Drehle, supra note 6; see also Bogdanich, supra note 5.  
 9. Bogdanich, supra note 5. 
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LeRoy Hubley of Toldeo, Ohio, watched his wife of forty-
eight years pass away.10  Mrs. Hubley had a kidney disease 
that required dialysis, a disorder she also passed to her son.11  
For months, Mrs. Hubley used Heparin, a commonly 
prescribed blood-thinner, not knowing that the batch she was 
given was counterfeit—the active ingredient was switched 
with a far cheaper substitute12 that would poison her to death.  
Within weeks, the Hubleys’ son suffered the same fate.13 
These three stories regarding trademark infringement, 
alongside countless others that have come out of the 
woodwork,14 all originate from a common source: China, the 
country that remains the single largest producer of counterfeit 
goods in the world.15  Just as China has become the world’s 
leading exporter of manufactured goods, it is likewise 
dominating the underground market for knock-offs.16 
The purpose of this Comment is to explore trademark 
counterfeiting.  Part I will discuss what trademark 
counterfeiting comprises of, the current laws in place, and the 
impact the act leaves on companies in the United States.17  
Part II will examine why trademark counterfeiting occurs and 
why, despite being the target of severe international scrutiny 
and criticism for over a decade, there still appears to be little 
evidence18 of marked improvement.19  Lastly, Part III will 
 10. Bill Powell, Heparin’s Deadly Side Effects, TIME (Nov. 13, 2008), 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1858870-1,00.html; see also 
Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Says Drug Contamination May Have Been Deliberate, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2008, at A11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/04/30/health/policy/30heparin.html. 
 11. See Powell supra note 10; see also Harris supra note 10. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Goodwin, supra note 1. 
 15. Dalila Hoover, Coercion Will Not Protect Trademark Owners in China, 
But an Understanding of China’s Culture Will: A Lesson the United States Has to 
Learn, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 325, 326 (2011). 
 16.  Andrew Yeh, The Complex Trade in Luxurious Fakes, FIN. TIMES OF ASIA 
(Apr. 19, 2006), available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/1/05eb362c-cef7-
11da-925d-0000779e2340.html#axzz2CXW0cpUl. 
 17. See infra Part I. 
 18.  See generally Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic 
of China, 78 WASH. U. L.R. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Chow, Counterfeiting in the 
PRC]; Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy 
Seriously, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 203, 204 (2006) [hereinafter Chow, China Does 
Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously]. 
 19. See infra Part II. 
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recommend strategies for ending China’s counterfeit crisis.20 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. What is Counterfeiting? 
Trademark counterfeiting has become increasingly 
pervasive in international trade.21  From 2004 to 2009, China 
dominated in counterfeit production by a wide margin, 
accounting for 77% of the aggregate value of goods seized in 
the United States—with the next country in line accounting for 
merely 7%.22  China’s extensive history of corruption and its 
ineffective enforcement of anti-counterfeiting in the field of 
intellectual property have certainly been heavily 
documented.23  In particular, Chinese trademark 
counterfeiting has been the target of intense scrutiny, from 
U.S. Senators24 to the chairman of Louis Vuitton,25 who 
bemoaned China as being an especially big headache.26  In 
August 2012, U.S. Customs and Border Protection reported 
that customs agents seized nearly 25,000 counterfeit goods 
during fiscal year 2011, amounting to an estimated $1.1 billion 
in lost sales.27  In reality, the number of counterfeit products 
 20. See infra Part III. 
 21. THE U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM. CHAIRMAN’S STAFF, SEN. BOB CASEY, 
CHAIRMAN, THE IMPACT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT ON THE ECONOMY 1 (Aug. 
2012), available at http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/ 
index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=aa0183d4-8ad9-488f-9e38-7150a3bb62be 
[hereinafter Congress Joint Economic Committee]. 
 22. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
OBSERVATIONS ON EFFORTS TO QUANTIFY THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COUNTERFEIT 
AND PIRATED GOODS 8 (2010), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/303057.pdf. 
 23. Nastase, supra note 7, at 145; see also Donald P. Harris, The 
Honeymoon is Over: The U.S.-China WTO Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 96, 102 (2009). 
 24. Counterfeit Goods: Easy Cash for Criminals and Terrorists: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 
1–3 (2005) (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins, Chairman, S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff.), available at https://bulk.resource.org/ 
gpo.gov/hearings/109s/21823.pdf [hereinafter Hearing].  
 25. See e.g., Yeh, supra note 16 (Bernard Arnault is the LVMH chairman and 
also France’s richest man. LVMH includes the Louis Vuitton, Fendi, Givenchy, 
Moët & Chandon, and Dom Perignon brands).  
 26. Id. 
 27. Congress Joint Economic Committee, supra note 21; see also CBP 
OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SECURITY, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS FISCAL YEAR 2011 SEIZURE STATISTICS (2012), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/iprcenter/pdf/ipr-fy-2011-seizure-report.pdf; Sheryl 
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that pass undetected is immeasurably higher because of the 
impossibility to screen each imported shipment of goods.  In 
the port of Los Angeles alone, 14 million containers arrive 
every year, but authorities are able to examine less than 1% 
of those containers.28  Overall, counterfeiting cost American 
businesses $250 billion in lost revenue in 2011,29 and while 
trademark counterfeiting occurs worldwide, China accounts 
for the vast majority of fake goods detained at the U.S. 
border.30 
In this Comment, “counterfeiting” refers to the unlawful 
act of one party in producing exact copies of merchandise 
with trademarks owned by another party.31  Counterfeiting 
involves an effort to market fake merchandise as genuine by 
creating a replicated product that appears to be 
indistinguishable from the authentic product.32  To do so, 
counterfeiters use the same trade dress as the original 
product on the knock-off and often even include on the 
pirated goods the name and address of the manufacturer 
whose product and trademark has been infringed upon.33  
Counterfeit products also raise product quality concerns and 
pose consumer risks because the replicated goods are of 
lower quality, yet the counterfeiter attempts to pass off the 
product as genuine and originating from a well-known brand 
name.34 
B. Current Laws in Place 
In 1982, China adopted the Trademark Law, which was 
devised to address many of the same concerns covered by 
Harris, ‘Faux, Faux Faux.’ Dodge Counterfeits As  
You Shop For the Holidays: Plain Dealing, CLEVELAND SUN.COM  
(Nov. 17, 2012, 12:00 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/consumeraffairs/index.ssf/ 
2012/11/dodging_counterfeits_as_you_sh.html. 
 28. Elizabeth Lee, Counterfeit Industry Tied to Organized Crime, Terrorism, 
VOICE OF AM. (July 4, 2012), http://www.voanews.com/content/counterfeit-
industry-tied-to-organized-crime-terrorism/1363590.html. 
 29. Greg Hardesty, Police Crack Down on Designer Deceit in O.C., ORANGE 
CNTY. REG. (Nov. 16, 2012), http://www.ocregister.com/news/counterfeit-
377983-agents-merchandise.html (citing the International Anti-Counterfeiting 
Coalition). 
 30. Congress Joint Economic Committee, supra note 21. 
 31. Chow, Counterfeiting in the PRC, supra note 18, at 449. 
 32. Id. at 450. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 450–51. 
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the trademark law in the United States.35  Under the 
Trademark Law, a party may infringe by using a mark that is 
the same or similar to another’s on the same or similar goods, 
selling goods that bear another’s mark, or counterfeiting 
another’s mark.36  Similar to the American doctrine of 
contributory infringement, providing storage or shipping 
products for the purpose of infringement also incurs liability.37  
Then, when the amount of infringing sales involved is 
“relatively large” or “huge,” infringers may face criminal 
charges.38 
It would be fair to say that China’s existing framework for 
trademark protection is viable because the Chinese 
government has shown its commitment to trademark 
protection through adopting both domestic laws and all major 
international treaties.39  In 1980, China became a contracting 
party of the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), 
a United Nations agency comprised of over 185 member 
states dedicated to protecting intellectual property.40  In 1985, 
China became a member of the Paris Convention for the 
Protection of Intellectual Property (“Paris Convention”), and in 
order to comply with the Convention’s requirements, passed 
the 2001 Trademark Law and the 2003 Provisions on the 
Determination and Protection of Well-Known Marks.41  In 
1995, China joined the Protocol Relating to the Madrid 
Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks 
(“Madrid Protocol”), an international system for registering 
marks.42  Lastly, in 2001, China became a member of the 
World Trade Organization, signing the Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement43 and amending 
existing Chinese law to comply with Article 16 of the 
 35. Timothy Lau, Kyle Niemi & Lanna Wu, Note, Protecting Trademark Rights 
in China Through Litigation, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 441, 442 (2011). 
 36. Id. at 443. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Hoover, supra note 15, at 337. 
 40. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP.ORG., http://www.wipo.int/members/en/ 
(last visited Apr. 27, 2014).  
 41. Hoover, supra note 15, at 335–36. 
 42. Id. at 336. 
 43. Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Ministerial Conference Approves 
China’s Accession (Nov. 10, 2001), 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/ 
pr252_e.htm. 
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agreement.44  By continually committing themselves to 
conventions, treaties, and agreements, China demonstrates 
its commitment to meeting international standards for 
protecting intellectual property.45  Moreover, China’s 
participation in the international platform is particularly 
important because under Chinese law, when a conflict arises 
between Chinese domestic law and international standards, 
the international rules will apply.46 
It is important to note, however, that having laws that 
comply on paper with international standards means little 
when enforcement of the laws is weak.47  In the United States, 
the incentive to copy is heavily offset by the criminal 
sanctions that result if caught.48  On the contrary, China has a 
developing legal structure that is inadequate in enforcing 
intellectual property rights.49 
C. Resulting Problems from Counterfeiting 
1. Trademark Owner’s Rights Infringed 
Innovation stimulates both economic growth and 
employment opportunities, and at the core of ensuring that 
individuals pursue such innovation is the assurance that their 
intellectual property rights will be protected.50  By contrast, 
counterfeiting stunts economic growth and erodes the returns 
on innovation because the negative impacts of potential theft 
on businesses diminish the incentive to create.51  Businesses 
often experience lost revenue and eventually, lower profits 
when sales from authentic goods are diverted to 
counterfeits.52  Profits are also negatively impacted by the 
added costs required to defend the business from future 
incidences of intellectual property infringement.53  
Additionally, the availability of a replicated good can put 
 44. Hoover, supra note 15, at 337. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Administrative Procedure Law (adopted Apr. 4,1989), art. 72 (China), 
available at http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2695. 
 47. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, supra note 
18, at 212. 
 48. Id. at 211–12. 
 49. Id. at 212. 
 50. Congress Joint Economic Committee, supra note 21. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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downward pressure on the price of the authentic product, 
causing further decline in revenue.54 
The proliferation of the Internet has significantly 
enhanced the accessibility to counterfeit goods.55  
Furthermore, counterfeiting techniques have become so 
developed and advanced that many fakes cannot be 
distinguished from the real product by the naked eye.56  
Accessibility to counterfeits in conjunction with nearly perfect 
replication skyrockets the likelihood of purchase and 
consumer confusion.  As a result, a company’s brand may be 
damaged when consumers, unaware that they purchased a 
counterfeit good, instead blame the maker of the genuine 
product for the poor-quality counterfeit they have received.57 
2. Consumer Risks 
Counterfeiting activity creates significant consumer 
safety risks, a concern that affects not only the well-being of 
individuals in the United States but the health and safety of 
individuals throughout the world.  Consumers are harmed 
when they purchase counterfeit items of lower quality 
because some goods, such as illegitimate medicines, pose 
devastating health and safety risks.58  For example, in 2007, 
consumers were unwittingly putting antifreeze in their mouths 
until Eduardo Arias, mentioned earlier, noticed a tube of 
counterfeit toothpaste marked with the words “diethylene 
glycol” (“DEG”).59  In the past, counterfeiters have substituted 
DEG as a cheap alternative for its more expensive chemical 
 54. Id. 
 55. John Schwartz, Black Market for Software is Sidestepping Export 
Controls, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/02/ 
business/technology-black-market-for-software-is-sidestepping-export-
controls.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm. 
 56. See e.g., Goodwin, supra note 1, at 53 (Goodwin, recounting a situation 
with one of her fashionable colleagues who experienced a rude awakening at a 
cocktail party: “[My colleague] was nibbling on canapés, a designer bag in the 
crook of her arm, when a publicist for the brand came over to chat and asked 
her where she’d bought her handbag.  My colleague had received it from her 
boyfriend—a much-loved first-anniversary gift—and he’d found it online at a 
great price.  “That bag is a fake,” the publicist informed her.  My colleague 
asked her how she could tell and was shown the subtle difference in stitching—
almost invisible to the naked eye—that separated her handbag from the genuine 
thing. She was mortified.”).   
 57. Congress Joint Economic Committee, supra note 21. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Bogdanich, supra note 5. 
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counterpart, glycerin.60  The tainted toothpaste was 
manufactured in China, falsely labeled under Colgate and 
Sensodyne brand names, and slipped into the international 
marketplace.61  Although the 2007 toothpaste scare in 
Panama did not result in any consumer deaths in the United 
States,62 another drug the following year did. 
In 2008, eighty-one people died from ingesting a 
Chinese-made counterfeit version of the drug Heparin,63 a 
blood thinner commonly used prior to surgery64 and often 
prescribed to dialysis patients.65  LeRoy Hubley, mentioned 
earlier, watched his wife and son pass away from severe 
allergic reactions brought on by a counterfeit version of the 
drug—both used the blood thinners to regimen their 
hereditary kidney disorder and were fatally poisoned by a 
replicated version.66  The Food and Drug Administration 
identified Changzhou SPL, a Chinese subsidiary of Scientific 
Protein Laboratories,67 as the source of the adulterated blood 
thinners, which substituted the use of genuine heparin with 
oversulfated chondroitin sulfate—a contaminant estimated to 
cost merely $9 per pound, as opposed to $900 per pound, the 
cost of authentic heparin.68  In light of these stark price 
differences and the discovery that nearly one-third of the 
material in some batches of heparin comprised of the cheaper 
replacement led federal drug regulators to believe that the 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Editorial, The Frightening Heparin Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2008 at A22, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/28/opinion/28mon2.html? 
pagewanted=print&_r=0; see also Olga Khazan, Here’s Why 10 Percent of the 
Developing World’s Drugs Are Fake, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2012, 10:33 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/11/14/heres-why-
10-percent-of-the-developing-worlds-drugs-are-fake/. 
 64. News Release, U.S  Food & Drug Admin., Baxter’s Multiple-Dose Vial 
Heparin Linked to Severe Allergic Reactions (Feb. 11, 2008), http:// 
www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2008/ucm116858.h
tm. 
 65. Heparin Injections, MEDLINE PLUS, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/ 
medlineplus/druginfo/meds/a682826.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (describing 
the composition of heparin). 
 66. Harris, supra note 10.  
 67. Id.  (Scientific Protein Laboratories supplied the contaminated heparin 
material to Baxter International, which manufactured and delivered the finished 
drug.). 
 68. Id. 
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contamination was deliberate.69  Though Chinese officials 
have disputed the contention that the replacement chemical 
caused death and injury, the circumstances were still enough 
for FDA Commissioner Andrew C. von Eschenbach to 
describe the contamination as a result of “economic fraud.”70  
Ultimately, the batches of blood-thinning drugs laced with 
counterfeit active ingredients were shipped to eleven 
countries and suspected in the deaths of eighty-one people.71 
Dangerous imitation drugs are not a recent discovery72 
and its development is far from elementary—to the contrary, it 
operates within complex international frameworks.73  
Accordingly, Andrew Jackson, head of corporate security at 
Novartis, describes the counterfeit drug trade as “not exactly 
a mom-and-pop operation,” but rather as “organized crime.”74  
For example, by the time the adulterated drugs arrive in the 
United States, the shipment has already traveled through 
multiple countries.  In one investigation, counterfeit drugs 
produced in China were transported by road to Hong Kong, 
sent by air to Dubai, and passed through London Heathrow 
on the way to the counterfeit organization’s warehouse 
fulfillment center in the Bahamas.75  From there, the drugs 
were shipped to another organization in the U.K., which then 
ultimately delivered the packages to the United States.76  
Since 2000, FDA inspections of counterfeit drugs have 
increased by over 20% and consumer danger does not end 
with purses, toiletries, and pharmaceuticals.77  On many street 
corners in some American cities, buyers can find counterfeit 
golf clubs, eggs,78 sneakers, auto parts, and infant formula.79 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See e.g., Harris, supra note 10 (Heparin is made from the mucous 
membranes of the intestines of slaughtered pigs that, in China, are often cooked 
in unregulated family workshops.  The FDA has identified 12 Chinese companies 
that have supplied contaminated heparin to 11 countries—Australia, Canada, 
China, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand 
and the United States). 
 72. Nastase, supra note 7. 
 73. Paul Toscano, The Dangerous World of Counterfeit Prescription Drugs, 
USA TODAY (Oct. 7, 2011, 5:50 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/ 
industries/health/drugs/story/2011-10-09/cnbc-drugs/50690880/1. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Nastase, supra note 7. 
 78. Patrick Boehler, Bad Eggs: Another Fake-Food Scandal Rocks China, 
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3. Criminal Activity 
i. Terrorist Groups 
Counterfeiting activity is also correlated with supporting 
criminal activity both in China and the United States.80  
Spencer Burgess, director of Carratu International’s 
Intellectual Property Investigations Division, warns against the 
common misconception that counterfeiting is run by small 
businesses attempting to make some extra income.81  Rather, 
counterfeiting is significantly more organized and malicious.82  
Links have been found between counterfeiting and Al-Qaeda, 
Hezbollah, the Russian Mafia, and drug cartels.83  Indeed, Al-
Qaeda training materials exposed that part of their funding 
was acquired through counterfeit goods.84 
Though purchasing faux Gucci sunglasses85 or a pair of 
fake Tory Burch shoes seems harmless enough, such small 
purchases can serve as funding sources for international 
terrorism because terrorist attacks do not require a significant 
amount of money.86  For example, the devastating 9/11 
attacks are estimated to have cost only $500,000,87 and the 
1993 World Trade Center bombing only cost an estimated 
$10,000.88  In her statement to the U.S. Senate, Senator Susan 
Collins explained that such a sum is effortlessly generated 
TIME (Nov. 6 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/11/06/how-to-make-a-
rotten-egg/. 
 79. Nastase, supra note 7; see also Hearing, supra note 24, at 5–6 
(statement of Sen. Daniel Akaka) (Senator Akaka stressed that counterfeit goods 
is not a victimless crime.  Counterfeit baby formula sold in China resulted in the 
deaths of 13 infants and serious illness to another 171 infants). 
 80. Hearing, supra note 24. 
 81. Rise in Counterfeit Market Linked To Terrorist Funding,  
FRAUDAID, http://www.fraudaid.com/scamspeak/conprods.htm [hereinafter 
Terrorist Funding]. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id.; see also Lee, supra note 28; see also Kevin Lewis, The Fake and the 
Fatal: The Consequences of Counterfeits, 17 PARK PLACE ECONOMIST 48, 52 
(2009), available at http://www.iwu.edu/economics/PPE17/lewis.pdf. 
 84. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., TERRORIST 
FINANCING STAFF MONOGRAPH 19, available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ 
911/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Ch2.pdf; see also Terrorist Funding, supra 
note 81. 
 85. Hardesty, supra note 29. 
 86. Nastase, supra note 7.  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
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from the sale of counterfeit goods.89  Each day, investigators 
find evidence strongly suggesting that terrorist groups are 
raising funds through the sale of counterfeit goods.90 As such, 
a critical aspect in counter-terrorism efforts is to stifle such 
funding sources that allow terror groups to operate.91 
ii. Child Labor 
On the other side of purchasing counterfeit goods are the hands, 
working for a pittance92, which created the products. Over the years, 
stories of the tragic lengths to which counterfeiting operators have gone 
leaked out of China.93  Though Shanghai and Beijing have rapidly 
become the glittering cities of the future, where over 250,000 Chinese 
“dollar millionaires” now live a life of luxury, the rural economy has 
collapsed during China’s economic restructuring.94  As a result, many 
families in need of supplemental income are forced to send their 
children to work in ramshackle factories,95 the children’s labor fueling 
the $600 billion per year counterfeiting industry.96  Although children 
under sixteen years of age are not legally allowed to work in China, 
those laws are not always enforced.97  Further shielding the public from 
labor circumstances in China are regulations mandated in 2000 by the 
Ministry of Labor classifying child-labor statistics as state secrets.98  
However, despite the local government’s effort to suppress what occurs 
behind the closed doors of counterfeiting warehouses, tales of child 
labor, often tantamount to slave labor, have nonetheless been 
exposed.99 
 89. Hearing, supra note 24, at 1–3 (statement of Sen. Susan M. Collins, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Aff.). 
 90. Hearing, supra note 24, at 10–14 (testimony of Kris Buckner, President 
of Investigative Consultants) (Investigate Consultants is a licensed private 
investigative firm based in Southern California specializing in investigations 
involving the manufacture, distribution, and sale of counterfeit goods). 
 91. Nastase, supra note 7, at 153. 
 92. Rising Slavery and Child Labor in China, ASIA BURNING, 
http://www.asiaburning.com/entry/rising-slavery-and-child-labor-in-china/. 
 93. Corsi, supra note 4. 
 94. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 54. 
 95. Dana Thomas, The Fight Against Fakes, HARPER’S BAZAAR  
(Jan. 9, 2009), http://www.harpersbazaar.com/magazine/feature-articles/the-
fight-against-fakes-0109. 
 96. About Counterfeiting, INT’L ANTI-COUNTERFEITING COAL., available at 
http://www.iacc.org/counterfeiting-statistics.html. 
 97. Goodwin, supra note 1, at 54. 
 98. Id.; see also Rising Slavery and Child Labor in China, ASIA BURNING, 
available at http://www.asiaburning.com/entry/rising-slavery-and-child-labor-in-
china/. 
 99. See e.g., Goodwin, supra note 1, at 54 (“The people who run factories 
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II. ANALYSIS 
A. Why Does Counterfeiting Occur? 
1. History 
History shows that Chinese counterfeiting is virtually as 
old as America itself.100  In 1784, the first American ship 
traveled from New York to modern-day Guangzhou, returning 
the following year with a cargo of tea, cotton fabric, and 
porcelain that earned investors a 25% return.101  American 
ships began voyaging to Guangzhou, and the Chinese 
craftsman they encountered were among the world’s most 
talented and productive—and particularly skillful at 
duplicating images.102  In the early 1830s, the Carnes brothers 
of New York City began sending French imports to 
Guangzhou for Chinese craftsmen to replicate at a fraction of 
the cost of an original.103  Remarkable imitations began 
flooding the French-crazed New York and were sold at 
authentic prices, generating for the Carnes brothers a 
spectacular return on their investment.104  Today, Chinese 
counterfeiting operates at a magnitude far greater than it did 
centuries ago,105 and an examination of China’s history 
reveals the foundation of trademark counterfeiting.  The 
ongoing issue of counterfeiting in China needs to be analyzed 
with an awareness of the country’s cultural roots and heritage 
because a historical perspective of China will show how 
deeply embedded the issue of counterfeiting is and will 
proffer an explanation as to why enforcement has been 
ineffective. 106 
Historically, China has been characterized as a 
collectivist society, where individualistic needs are 
suppressed to enhance the harmony of the greater society.107  
are scumbags, hiring children, locking employees in production areas where 
there have been fires and they can’t escape.”). 
 100. Eric Jay Dolin, Debate Jibes Ignore Chinese Counterfeiting’s Long 
History, REUTERS (Oct. 24, 2012), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/ 
2012/10/24/debate-jibes-ignore-chinese-counterfeitings-long-history/. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 2. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Hoover, supra note 15, at 343. 
 107. Edward Yui-tim Wong, The Chinese At Work: Collectivism or 
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As a result, the concept of intellectual property rights conflicts 
with long-established Chinese values.  Deemed a moral code 
by many, Confucianism served as a guide for proper Chinese 
behavior from the sixth century B.C. to the middle of the 
twentieth century, and Chinese imperial rules followed 
Confucian beliefs to maintain their authority and 
governmental regime.108  Confucianism focused on the fluidity 
and passing down of intellectual property for others to further 
build on, encouraged imitation of teachers as a method of 
learning, and emphasized subordination of individual interests 
to benefit the greater societal good.109  For the good of 
society, work products were generated for and collectively 
owned by the State,110 not for the creator to individually gain 
from.  Consequently, asserting intellectual property rights by 
excluding others is instinctively at odds with this communal 
social order: new products ought to be invented and branded 
not only for the individual creator’s own benefit but shared 
with all members of the community as a whole.111  In 1949, the 
Chinese Communist Party emerged and furthered the 
traditional collectivist mentality.112  Therefore, historically, the 
Chinese simply did not view intellectual property rights as an 
individual right requiring protection—on the contrary, sharing 
with others and copying from others were not only perfectly 
acceptable ways of life, they were highly encouraged.113 
Furthermore, traditional Chinese culture places a heavy 
emphasis on informal methods of social ordering such as 
hierarchy and morality before turning to state laws.114  
Individualism? H.K. INST. OF BUS. STUDIES (Feb. 2001), 
http://www.library.ln.edu.hk/eresources/etext/hkibs/hkws_0040.pdf. 
 108. Hoover, supra note 15, at 343 (citing Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic 
Approach and East-Asian: From the Legal Culture Perspective, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & 
POL’Y J. 13, 87 (2000)). 
 109. Hoover, supra note 15, at 343–44. 
 110. Id. at 344. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Dexin Tian, The Chinese Cultural Perceptions of Innovation, Fair Use, 
and the Public Domain: A Grass-Roots Approach to Studying the U.S.-China 
Copyright Disputes 50–51 (Dec. 2008) (unpublished dissertation, Bowling Green 
State University), available at https://etd.ohiolink.edu/rws_etd/ 
document/get/bgsu1224963994/inline. 
 113. Hoover, supra note 15, at 344. 
 114. Aileen M. McGill, How China Succeeded in Protecting Olympic 
Trademarks and Why This Success May Not Generate Immediate Improvements 
in Intellectual Property Protection in China, 9 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 1, 6 (2009-
2010). 
 
CHANG FINAL 8/21/2014  4:08 PM 
2014] TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING 779 
Confucianism disapproved of litigation,115 considered 
harmony with others a virtue,116 and utilized external laws only 
when self-regulation failed to provide an adequate remedy.117  
Believing in the rule of man rather than the rule of law, one of 
Confucianism’s basic tenets states: 
Lead the people with governmental measures and regulate 
them by law and punishments, and they will avoid wrong-
doing, but will have no sense of honor or shame.  Lead 
them by virtue and regulate them by the rules of propriety 
and they will have a sense of shame, and moreover, set 
themselves straight.118 
Therefore, the driving force behind morality and proper 
behavior is the Chinese’s fear of shame and dishonor to the 
country,119 not reverence for legal regulations.  Indeed, in 
many trademark infringement cases, the penalty ordered by 
the court is through shaming,120 not a financial penalty: the 
Chinese believe that such embarrassment should serve as an 
adequate deterrent for future misbehavior.121  Such penalties 
show that a primary reason for China’s problems regarding 
trademark infringement and legal enforcement is the 
country’s long-cherished and deep-rooted culture.122 
Although over the past century China has undergone a 
swift political and economic transformation, the cultural 
mores and the laws of the country have consistently 
preserved a Confucian and Marxist undertone of subjugating 
individual interest for the greater good of society.123  Many 
people in China still believe that all creative works belong to 
the society as a whole124 and with such rich, long-standing 
traditions, the high levels of counterfeiting occurring in China 
 115. Tian, supra note 112, at 52. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Hoover, supra note 15, at 344. 
 118. Hoover, supra note 15 at 344 citing William P. Alford, To Steal A Book is 
an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization 20 
(STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1997).  
 119. Hoover, supra note 15, at 345. 
 120. See e.g., id. (Public apologies are often the penalty required of an 
infringer. If an infringer fails to apologize as ordered, the court may publish an 
apology on their behalf). 
 121. Id. at 345. 
 122. Id. at 347. 
 123. McGill, supra note 114, at 6 citing Tao-Tai Hsia & Kathryn A. Huan, Laws 
of the People’s Republic on Industrial and Intellectual Property, 5 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 743, 750 (1973). 
 124. Tian, supra note 112, at 53. 
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today become unsurprising. 
1. Local Protectionism and Governmental Corruption: 
“The Sky is High and the Emperor is Far Away”125 
One reason why China participates so readily in 
counterfeiting is because of local protectionism: since the 
Chinese governmental structure is dominated by local—and 
often corrupt—power, international treaties and laws are 
difficult to enforce.126  Despite acts of enforcement by the 
local government,127 another reason why counterfeiting is so 
widespread is the lack of deterrence.  China’s chronic 
underutilization of criminal punishment128 is essentially the 
equivalent of having no deterrence at all because the 
infringers face very lenient penalties, particularly in 
comparison to the profit they stand to gain per replicated 
product.129 
i. Lack of (True) Enforcement: Counterfeiting is Fuel 
for the Chinese Economy 
Although the central government, People’s Republic of 
China (“PRC”), has made frequent declarations regarding the 
importance of protecting intellectual property rights in 
China,130 actual enforcement occurs at the local level.131  At 
the ground level, pervasive issues of local protectionism and 
other types of government corruption plague the possibility of 
successful enforcement against counterfeiting132 because of 
 125. Walt Bogdanich & Jake Hooker, From China to Panama, a Trail of 
Poisoned Medicine, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/05/06/world/americas/06poison.html?pagewanted=all.  “The sky is high 
and the emperor is far away” describes how the realities of provincial life are 
distant from activities in Beijing.  Id. 
 126. Hoover, supra note 15, at 341. 
 127. Daniel C.K. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National 
Companies in China: How a Flawed Approach is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 
41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 749, 756 (2010) [hereinafter Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting 
Strategies].  “Law enforcement officials wish to appease multi-national 
companies [in combating counterfeiting], yet also do not wish to shut down the 
counterfeiting trade.”  Id. 
 128. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2008 SPECIAL 301REPORT 21, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/asset_upload_file553_14869.pdf. 
 129. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127. 
 130. See CTR. GOV’T OF CHINA, Action Plan on IPR Protection for 2007 (Apr. 6, 
2007), http://www.gov.cn/english/2007-04/06/content_574197.htm.  
 131. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 754. 
 132. Id. 
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the direct and indirect interests the local government has in 
letting the counterfeiting trade thrive.  While U.S. companies 
protest that they are losing billions of dollars from their 
inventions being copied and sold in China, their losses 
sustain the Chinese local economy.133  Local government 
officials are often unwilling to enforce trademark laws against 
businesses because the companies generate sizeable 
amounts of income for the government.134  Some businesses 
are so successful that their revenues single-handedly fuel the 
entire local government135 because clusters of legitimate 
businesses (i.e. hotels, restaurants, nightclubs, and 
warehouses) all depend on the counterfeit business.136 
Powerful local government officials are also infused into 
management positions in various counterfeiting companies 
because the presence of the government officials 
demonstrates that the companies will be strongly defended 
by local governments—and local governments in China 
control all levels of power in law enforcement.137  For 
example, the local government elects the province’s judges, 
police officers, and administrative enforcement officials.138  If 
these individuals choose to act contrary to the objectives of 
the local government, they risk retaliatory action such as 
being discharged from their jobs, demoted, or reduced 
income.139  The pressure of ceding to the wishes of local 
government leaders repeatedly overrides the enforcement 
officials’ desire to enforce laws against counterfeiters,140 
making true enforcement practically impossible. 
Further adding to the local government’s unwillingness to 
counter the counterfeiting trade is the fact that counterfeiting 
provides much-needed jobs.141  In fact, putting an end to 
counterfeiting would mean loss of jobs, which augments a 
government official’s inclination to turn a blind eye towards 
 133. Kristi Heim, Inside China’s Teeming World of Fake Goods,  
SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 13, 2006, 1:14 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/ 
businesstechnology/2002782434_chinapiracy12.html. 
 134. Hoover, supra note 15, at 341. 
 135. DANIEL C.K. CHOW & ANNA M. HAN, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 378 (2012).  
An example of such a city is Yiwu.  Id. 
 136. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 756. 
 137. Id. at 755. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 755. 
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enforcing intellectual property laws142 because PRC officials 
fear unemployment the most—unemployment will cause 
social turmoil, chaos, and unrest.143  As attorney Nelson Dong 
explains: “The government’s tacit winking of the eye is 
because they know they are getting something from non-
enforcement.”144  Not only does the counterfeiting industry 
help maintain social order, local governments receive a 
substantial amount of taxes from sellers and distributors of 
counterfeit goods.145  The local government also receives 
significant rent payments from the shop owners because 
hundreds of tenants pay rent to a management company that 
leases the land from the city.146  For some locations, rent 
reaches nearly $5,000 a month,147 accruing for the local 
government millions of dollars to use towards providing 
essential public services.148  In addition, local governments 
are rewarded with subsidies if they meet economic targets set 
by the national authorities.149  Therefore, even though China’s 
central government may be working towards reducing 
counterfeiting,150 the many incentives for local authorities’ 
non-compliance seriously hinder any progress towards 
eradicating counterfeiting. 
Ultimately, counterfeiting in China persists because 
counterfeiting is a lucrative business and enforcement 
authorities have no incentive to dismantle their local 
economies by shutting down the activities.  The number of 
enforcement activities is in fact very high.151 However, while 
the enforcement activity is significant, nearly no punishment 
results.152  Therefore, the critical problem lies with deterrence. 
Without adequate deterrence, counterfeiting continues. 
ii. Lack of Deterrence 
In order to effectively combat counterfeiting, focus needs 
 142. Heim, supra note 133. 
 143. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 756. 
 144. Heim, supra note 133. 
 145. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 755. 
 146. Heim, supra note 133. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 755. 
 149. Id. at 756. 
 150. Heim, supra note 133. 
 151. Id. at 212. 
 152. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, supra note 
18, at 212. 
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to be placed on deterrence because without a severe penalty 
resulting from enforcement activities, any amount of raids is 
useless.  There has been a marked increase in enforcement 
activities153 but the raids and seizures do not penalize enough 
for an infringer to cease any wrongdoing because the fines 
imposed on trademark infringers are far too low.154  Penalties 
for trademark infringement are calculated by the price of the 
replicated good on the counterfeit market rather than by the 
value of the original brand.  Since the value of counterfeit 
products is lower than the value of the original, fines are often 
too small to outweigh the profits of engaging in the 
counterfeiting trade.155  Furthermore, only 1 in 489 cases are 
criminally prosecuted,156 and even then, infringers are 
generally only subjected to probation.157  China’s high 
threshold for criminal prosecution of trademark infringement 
fails to provide effective deterrence because infringers often 
see these minor penalties as simply part of the ordinary 
course of business.158  Therefore, China must not only 
heighten enforcement, but also increase counterfeiting 
penalties as well in order to truly effectuate enforcement 
activities.  The following example of the 2008 Olympic Games 
in Beijing provides a good model to pursue. 
A central component as to why China was so successful 
in thwarting counterfeiting activity surrounding the Olympic 
Games was because of local government efforts: enforcement 
mechanisms were improved and penalties were increased.159  
When China was awarded the Olympics in 2001, the country 
responded by immediately passing legislation and 
enforcement procedures for the protection of Olympic 
trademarks.160  The Beijing municipal government issued a 
decree on the Protection of Olympic Intellectual Property 
Provisions by the Beijing Municipality, the Beijing Organizing 
 153. Id. 
 154. Hoover, supra note 15, at 342.  For example, the average penalty paid by 
a counterfeiter in 2000 was $794.  Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial 
Piracy Seriously, supra note 18, at 212. 
 155. Hoover, supra note 15, at 342. 
 156. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, supra note 
18, at 212. 
 157. Nastase, supra note 7, at 154. 
 158. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, supra note 
18, at 212. 
 159. McGill, supra note 114, at 21. 
 160. Id. at 23. 
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Committee for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad (“BOCOG"), 
which created a legal department assigned to protecting 
Olympic intellectual property rights, and the national 
government endorsed the Regulations on the Protection of 
Olympic Insignia.161  Interestingly enough, the text of the 
Olympic trademark legislation was practically identical to 
existing national trademark legislation.162  However, the 
differences between the two were the enforcement criteria 
and increased penalties. 
First, enforcement against counterfeiting was heightened 
surrounding the Olympic Games by specifically delegating to 
the Administration of Industry and Commerce the duty of 
enforcing Olympic intellectual property violations.163  
Additionally, the BOCOG organized their own enforcement 
staff dedicated to monitoring the market for incidences of 
Olympic trademark infringement.164  These actions by the 
Chinese government sent a clear message regarding their 
expectations of intellectual property rights and held local 
government officials accountable when they failed to report 
trademark infringement in favor of local interests.165 
Second, along with enhanced enforcement, penalties for 
Olympic trademarks were determined from the Olympic item’s 
official licensing fee rather than the arbitrary (and lower) price 
of the infringing product.166  Furthermore, fines could be 
imposed even when no illegal income was earned.167  Such 
legislation offered a double layer of protection: by calculating 
damages off of the more-expensive, genuine product rather 
than the counterfeit price, penalties were higher and therefore 
served as a greater disincentive.  Then, the threat of fines 
even when no illegal income was seized further deterred 
potential infringers because the counterfeit trade becomes 
fiscally undesirable; the infringer’s purpose of counterfeiting 
essentially vanishes along with the disappearance of financial 
incentives.  Likewise, today, China should revise the penalties 
for trademark infringement to align with those passed in the 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 25. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 25–26. 
 166. Id. at 24. 
 167. Id. 
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Olympic regulations because counterfeiters are simply not 
troubled by the low fines imposed upon them.168  Determining 
fines through the market price for the trademarked product 
more appropriately compensates the market for the damage 
done by infringement.169  At the same time, the appeal of 
counterfeiting diminishes if the financial losses outweigh the 
gains.  By heightening enforcement activities and increasing 
penalties, China succeeded in protecting Olympic trademarks 
and similarly, China ought to utilize the same mechanisms 
towards eradicating counterfeiting altogether. 
III. HOW TO END COUNTERFEITING 
A. Education 
One step towards eradicating counterfeiting in China 
begins with a two-fold change in education: first, by instilling 
in children from a young age about the importance of 
protecting intellectual property rights in order to drive 
innovation, and second, by changing the tone through which 
such advice is administered.170  Children must learn from an 
early age the harm counterfeiting causes171 because despite 
China’s modern veneer, there still lays a deeply rooted 
cultural factor at work.172  From a young age, children in 
schools have been taught to emulate artistic and literary 
masters of the past, making the idea of intellectual property 
simply foreign.173  As David Zhang, vice president at a 
Shanghai company, explains: “When [students] study, [they] 
learn to copy the masters . . . if you say you want to be 
innovative, people say you’re crazy . . . that’s a cultural 
process, and it will take time to change.”174  With such strong 
cultural values, it will take nothing less than essentially 
starting from scratch for China to eradicate counterfeiting.  
China must educate from the ground up: Chinese children’s 
mindsets must be transformed so they grow to learn about 
the benefits of trademark protection rather than the negative, 
 168. Id. at 25. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 776. 
 171. McGill, supra note 114, at 29.  
 172. Heim, supra note 133. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
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visceral reaction the average Chinese citizen today feels 
towards intellectual property.175 
In addition to educating children from a young age 
regarding the importance of trademark protection, the U.S. 
government must adopt a different approach in encouraging 
China to take action against counterfeiting.  Currently, and in 
the past, most forms of “education” come in the form of the 
U.S. government berating PRC officials to increase their 
enforcement activities.176  Officials from the United States 
Trade Representative Office, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office, and the United States Custom Service all 
“educate” in the same manner: while a countless number of 
speakers lecture on the importance of more enforcement 
during training sessions, PRC officials sit back resentfully, 
“becoming totally disinterested, bored, sickened and 
hostile.”177  As Professor Daniel K. Chow describes: 
PRC officials have turned a deaf ear to the constant 
haranguing and castigation by U.S. government officials.  
This should not be surprising.  No one likes to be 
constantly lectured and pummeled for an endless list of 
shortcomings . . . . If one mentions “intellectual property” 
to the average person in China, the image that comes 
immediately to mind is that of the U.S. government 
lecturing in a condescending and arrogant fashion on the 
need to protect U.S. intellectual property rights.178 
The mounting demands made by the U.S. result in 
making the Chinese government and its officials more 
defensive than receptive to strengthening its trademark 
protection system,179 and therefore, the U.S. government’s 
method of education must change from a negative approach 
to a positive approach.180  If the U.S. government adopted a 
less abrasive form of “education” towards the PRC officials in 
urging their government to enforce trademark rights, and 
Chinese children are taught from an early age the benefits 
and importance of trademark protection, China can take 
strides towards eliminating counterfeiting with time. 
 175. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 776. 
 176. Id. at 775. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 776. 
 179. Hoover, supra note 15, at 347.  
 180. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 776. 
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B. Publicity 
Aside from education, another way towards ending 
counterfeiting is by exposing China’s activities to the public 
because the consequential apprehension and sense of 
national pride simultaneously increases China’s desire to 
abide by fair practices and decreases their willingness to 
accept misbehavior.  Though government corruption is illegal 
in China, it is tolerated so long as it remains shielded from the 
public eye.181  Therefore, the key to curbing local 
protectionism—and ultimately, counterfeiting—is by raising 
these issues with the PRC government and bringing them to 
the public’s attention.182  By exposing corruption, the 
Communist Party becomes embarrassed and feels obligated 
to act—and will generally do so promptly and mercilessly.183 
One example of such swift and effective action catalyzed 
by publicity was China’s quick execution of Zheng Xiaoyu, a 
former top drug and food regulator, exposed by the media to 
have taken bribes to approve untested medicine.184  Mr. 
Zheng’s case served a political purpose because his 
immediate and drastic punishment was the result of China 
scrambling to prove that the PRC government was serious 
about combating the country’s unimpressive product-safety 
history.185  As a Chinese official explained about the 
uncommonly prompt execution: “Corruption in the food and 
drug authority has brought shame to the nation.  What we will 
have to learn from the experience is to improve or work and 
emphasize public safety.”186  Since Mr. Zheng’s actions 
embarrassed the country and threatened China’s reputation 
abroad, government officials were compelled to—and did—
act quickly and severely in hopes of minimizing the damage 
done. 
Another example of quick government action prompted 
by publicity was China’s response to the Falun Gong, a 
pervasive social movement that was perceived to threaten the 
 181. Id. at 778. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Joseph Kahn, China Quick to Execute Drug Official, N.Y. TIMES  
(July 11, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/11/business/worldbusiness/ 
11execute.html?_r=0&adxnnl=1&pagewanted=all&adxnnlx=1355356922-
SJdjAEwNS5qztp3yIuXYMw. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
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Communist Party’s power and authority.187  Even though the 
movement involved millions of people throughout China, the 
government was able to completely eliminate the movement 
because they were under the pressure of severe international 
criticism.188  Therefore, despite China’s considerable 
geographical size and diversity,189 the government is capable 
of controlling even such widespread behavior—when the 
world is watching.  Accordingly, the same effect should be 
within the government’s power to effectuate in the realm of 
counterfeiting. 
In 2008, the Olympics in Beijing did just that: the Games 
put China in the spotlight, magnifying their achievements—
and shortcomings—in the field of intellectual property 
enforcement.190  Under such critical observation of the world, 
China underwent tremendous “packaging,”191 civility 
campaigns, and true enforcement activity in order to present 
China’s best foot forward.192  Global public relations firms 
were hired, campaigns to improve manners and foster new 
attitudes were initiated, celebrities and the media’s 
assistance were solicited, and perhaps most importantly, 
local efforts were significantly strengthened.193  Counterfeiting 
did still occur,194 but fake Olympic merchandise appeared less 
 187. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, supra note 
18, at 222. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual 
Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000) 
(describing how China’s size and diversity have impeded the enforcement of 
national laws). 
 190. McGill, supra note 114, at 28. 
 191. IR2008: Packaging China for the Olympics, CHINA RIGHTS FORUM,  
2007, at 123, available at http://www.hrichina.org/sites/default/files/PDFs/ 
CRF.1.2007/CRF-2007-1__complete.pdf.  “Packaging” refers to the efforts 
expended towards improving China’s image and preparing the country for 
international eyes. Major “packaging” participants include global public 
relations companies, legal services, advertising firms, and so on.  Id. 
 192. Calum MacLeod, China Wants Olympians to See Its Best Behavior, USA 
TODAY (Feb. 8, 2006, 9:32 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/ 
2006-02-08-china-manners_x.htm?POE=NEWISVA. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See e.g., Hamish McKenzie, Faking It: Piracy Poses Headache for 
Olympics, CNN, July 31, 2007, 
http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/07/24/ 
olympics.piracy/index.html?iref=newssearch.  (Chinese authorities uncovered 
over 1,500 cases of violations involving Beijing Olympic slogans, logos, and 
other trademarks between 2004 and 2005, resulting in fake goods worth $1.9 
million. However, these cases resulted in fines of nearly $1.1 million.). 
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frequently than one would imagine, even in markets normally 
filled with counterfeit designer goods.195  With their national 
pride at stake and heightened deterrence mechanisms, the 
Chinese felt a greater unwillingness to profit from Olympic 
symbols because bringing pride and honor to China remained 
of utmost importance.196 
Therefore, using Mr. Zheng’s execution, Falun Gong, and 
the Olympics as examples, one way China can end 
counterfeiting is through mobilizing its people and instilling a 
sense of national pride and responsibility towards achieving a 
common goal: when their “face” is on the line,197 China is 
more apt to properly comply.  As Zhang Huigang, director of 
Beijing’s Capital Ethics Development Office explains: “We 
want foreign guests to see the good side of Beijing . . . we 
want to give foreign guests a good impression.”198  Such 
publicity and its corresponding national pride, coupled with 
the government participation in truly enforcing against 
counterfeiting activity through deterrence and fear,199 can 
serve as a mighty force towards gradually eradicating the 
counterfeiting trade in China. 
C. Long-Term Approach 
Although revamping education and increasing publicity 
can contribute greatly towards ending the counterfeit trade, it 
must be acknowledged that any serious change in 
counterfeiting activity will be the result of long-term efforts 
rather than short-term.200  Local governmental authorities are 
unlikely to take significant action on their own initiative 
because of the financial support counterfeiting infuses to 
local economies.201  Consequently, local governments must 
 195. McGill, supra note 114, at 21. 
 196. Id. at 20. 
 197. McKenzie, supra note 194 (James McGregor, CEO of China research and 
advisory firm JL McGregor and Company, explained about the Olympics: “It’s 
international.  It’s China’s coming-out party.  It’s China’s face.  Who wants to 
put on the Olympics and be looked at as the low-class pirate country that steals 
everyone else’s trademarks?”). 
 198. Id. (Zhang concedes that the goal is difficult.). 
 199. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, supra note 
18, at 222 (explaining how China utilized draconian measures to eradicate the 
Falun Gong). 
 200. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies, supra note 127, at 773. 
 201. Chow, China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, supra note 
18, at 222. 
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be pressured by Beijing to instigate a serious crackdown.202  
However, the government is in no hurry to undertake such a 
crackdown because of the disastrous domino effect that 
results: local economics will be crippled, tax revenues for 
cities will be diminished, and local business that support 
counterfeit goods will be disturbed.203  Therefore, in light of 
the significant costs, China’s leaders have no compelling 
reason to take on the counterfeit crisis.204  China and its 
willingness to abide by guidelines is a matter of political will—
and since the political will to change does not currently exist, 
any significant improvement will require perhaps even 
decades.205  As Zhang, mentioned earlier, explains: “Building 
stadiums is no problem . . . but raising people’s quality and 
civilization is not something we can do in one or two months, 
or even one or two years.”206 
CONCLUSION 
Counterfeiting in China is particularly attractive because 
the penalties and risks of getting caught are very low while its 
money-generating potential is incredibly high.207  Effectively 
enforcing trademark law in a country whose deep cultural 
background is at odds with intellectual property rights will be 
a timely and ongoing challenge,208 especially with few 
incentives to counter the trade and a lack of political will.  
However, increasing penalties for trademark infringement will 
more successfully deter counterfeiting, as will education from 
an early age regarding the importance of protecting 
intellectual property rights and increased publicity to shed 
light upon the counterfeiting crisis in China.  And in doing so, 
perhaps incidences of tragedies suffered by Wang Yajuan and 
the Hubleys will with time fade away. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 223. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. at 224–25. 
 206. MacLeod, supra note 192. 
 207. Hearing, supra note 24, at 3–4 (statement of Sen. Joe Lieberman). 
 208. McGill, supra note 114, at 29. 
 
